The Disarmament Paradox: Why Military Strikes Can’t Force Peace

The harder Israel pushes militarily across the region, the more entrenched its adversaries become—a cycle that US envoy Tom Barrack suggests makes Hezbollah’s disarmament virtually impossible.

The Strategic Stalemate

In a revealing assessment, US envoy Tom Barrack has articulated what many regional analysts have long suspected: military pressure alone cannot achieve disarmament goals in the Middle East. His observation that Hezbollah has “zero incentive” to lay down weapons while under attack exposes a fundamental flaw in strategies that rely primarily on force to achieve political objectives. This dynamic isn’t unique to the Israel-Hezbollah relationship but reflects a broader pattern seen in asymmetric conflicts worldwide.

Expanding Theater of Operations

Barrack’s claim that Israeli operations extend beyond Gaza to include Syria, Lebanon, and even Tunisia points to an increasingly complex regional security landscape. While the accuracy of all locations mentioned requires verification, the perception of an expanding conflict zone itself becomes a strategic factor. Each military action, whether defensive or offensive, risks creating new grievances and drawing in additional actors, making de-escalation exponentially more difficult. This geographical spread of operations may serve immediate tactical purposes but complicates long-term strategic goals.

The Incentive Structure Problem

The envoy’s assessment highlights a critical policy challenge: how to create conditions for disarmament when military pressure produces the opposite effect. Hezbollah, like many non-state armed groups, derives legitimacy from resistance narratives. Continued strikes reinforce these narratives, strengthening internal cohesion and external support. This creates a perverse incentive structure where military success tactically can mean strategic failure in achieving lasting security. Historical precedents from Northern Ireland to Colombia suggest that sustainable disarmament typically requires a combination of security guarantees, political inclusion, and face-saving exit strategies—elements notably absent in the current context.

Breaking the Cycle

The implications of Barrack’s observation extend far beyond the immediate Israel-Hezbollah dynamic. It challenges policymakers to reconsider whether traditional military-centric approaches can achieve their stated goals in an era of hybrid warfare and non-state actors. Alternative frameworks might include graduated reciprocal initiatives, where small confidence-building measures create momentum for larger agreements, or third-party guarantee mechanisms that provide security assurances to all parties. The European Union’s role in monitoring the Egypt-Israel peace treaty offers one model, though adapting such approaches to non-state actors presents unique challenges.

If military strikes create incentives for armament rather than disarmament, what combination of carrots and sticks might actually work—and are regional powers willing to test alternatives before the current cycle becomes irreversible?