King Hussein Deploys Troops to Restore Order in Jordan Unrest

Black September’s Shadow: How a 50-Year-Old Conflict Still Shapes Middle Eastern Politics

The violent suppression of Palestinian militants in Jordan half a century ago reveals uncomfortable truths about how regional stability has always been built on the backs of stateless peoples.

The Forgotten War Within a War

In September 1970, King Hussein of Jordan made a decision that would forever alter the trajectory of Palestinian resistance and Arab politics. Facing an increasingly autonomous Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that had established a virtual state-within-a-state in Jordan, Hussein deployed 50,000 troops to crush what he viewed as an existential threat to Hashemite rule. The operation, which Palestinians would later call “Black September,” saw Jordanian forces bombard refugee camps in Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa with heavy artillery, resulting in thousands of casualties—mostly Palestinian civilians.

This military campaign was no mere police action. It represented the first major Arab-on-Arab conflict centered on the Palestinian question, exposing the fundamental tension between Palestinian national aspirations and the sovereignty concerns of Arab host states. The PLO had used Jordan as a base for operations against Israel, drawing Israeli retaliation that destabilized the kingdom. By 1970, Palestinian fedayeen openly challenged Jordanian authority, creating checkpoints, collecting taxes, and even attempting to assassinate King Hussein multiple times.

The Ripple Effects of Suppression

The immediate aftermath was catastrophic. Estimates of Palestinian deaths range from 3,000 to over 10,000, with tens of thousands more displaced. The PLO leadership fled to Lebanon, where their presence would contribute to that country’s devastating civil war just five years later. The trauma of Black September radicalized a generation of Palestinians, giving birth to the Black September Organization responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre and numerous airline hijackings.

Yet the long-term political implications proved even more significant. Jordan’s expulsion of the PLO effectively ended any possibility of Palestine-Jordan confederation—a solution long favored by moderate voices on both sides. It crystallized the Palestinian identity as distinctly separate from Jordanian, despite the fact that Palestinians constitute roughly half of Jordan’s population today. This demographic reality remains one of the kingdom’s most sensitive political issues, with Palestinian-Jordanians facing subtle discrimination while simultaneously forming the backbone of the private sector economy.

Contemporary Echoes

The Black September precedent continues to influence how Arab states manage Palestinian populations and resistance movements. Lebanon’s restrictions on Palestinian employment and property ownership, Syria’s careful control of Palestinian camps, and Egypt’s blockade of Gaza all reflect lessons learned from Jordan’s experience. These policies, while maintaining stability for host governments, have perpetuated Palestinian statelessness and radicalization—creating the very security threats they aim to prevent.

More recently, the normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states echo the pragmatism that King Hussein displayed in 1970—prioritizing regime survival and national interests over Pan-Arab solidarity with Palestinians. The Abraham Accords, much like Black September, represent Arab leaders’ calculation that their states’ futures cannot remain hostage to the unresolved Palestinian question.

As we witness ongoing violence in Gaza and the West Bank, with Arab states offering only rhetorical support to Palestinians, we must ask: Has the international community’s acceptance of Palestinian permanent displacement, first institutionalized during Black September, become the unstated foundation of Middle Eastern “stability”—and if so, how long can such stability endure when built on the systematic denial of an entire people’s aspirations?