Lebanon’s Security Paradox: Why the Call for Army Supremacy Exposes a Nation’s Deepest Fractures
The Patriarch’s stark warning about militias versus the Lebanese army reveals not just a security crisis, but the fundamental collapse of Lebanon’s post-civil war political settlement.
A Voice from the Pulpit Echoes National Anxiety
When Lebanon’s Maronite Patriarch speaks about security, the nation listens—not merely because of his religious authority, but because his office has historically served as a barometer for Christian anxieties in Lebanon’s delicate sectarian balance. His recent emphasis on the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as the sole legitimate guarantor of security represents more than theological guidance; it’s a direct challenge to the parallel military structures that have dominated Lebanese politics since the 1975-1990 civil war.
The timing of these remarks is particularly significant. Lebanon faces its worst economic crisis in modern history, with the currency losing over 98% of its value since 2019. Against this backdrop of state collapse, non-state armed groups—most notably Hezbollah—have expanded their roles as de facto service providers and security guarantors in various regions. The Patriarch’s intervention suggests growing alarm among Lebanon’s Christian leadership about this evolving reality.
The Militia Question: Lebanon’s Unfinished Business
Lebanon’s post-civil war Taif Agreement of 1989 mandated the dissolution of all militias, yet this provision remains selectively implemented. While most Christian and Sunni militias disarmed, Hezbollah retained its weapons under the rationale of “resistance” against Israeli occupation. This exception has evolved into a parallel state structure that challenges the monopoly of force traditionally reserved for national armies.
The “political and security vacuum” referenced in the Patriarch’s remarks reflects more than just weak institutions. It represents the fundamental contradiction at the heart of modern Lebanon: a state that claims sovereignty while tolerating—and in some cases depending upon—armed groups that operate outside its command structure. This arrangement has created what scholars call a “dual power” system, where state institutions coexist uneasily with militia networks that often provide more effective governance in their areas of control.
Regional Implications and International Concerns
The Patriarch’s warning about threats to “regional balance” acknowledges that Lebanon’s militia problem extends far beyond its borders. Non-state armed groups in Lebanon have become vectors for regional proxy conflicts, drawing the country into tensions between Iran and its adversaries. This dynamic has made Lebanon a battleground for competing regional visions, with ordinary Lebanese paying the price through economic isolation and periodic military escalation.
International actors, particularly Western governments and Gulf states, have long conditioned aid and investment on Lebanon addressing its militia problem. Yet these demands often collide with political realities: the very groups labeled as destabilizing forces command significant popular support in their communities and hold substantial representation in parliament. This creates a catch-22 where reforms necessary for international support would require confronting actors essential to the current power structure.
The Army as Symbol and Solution
The Lebanese Armed Forces occupy a unique position in national consciousness as perhaps the only institution that genuinely represents cross-sectarian unity. Unlike the political system, which divides power along confessional lines, the army draws from all communities and enjoys broad public trust. Recent polling consistently shows the LAF as Lebanon’s most respected institution, far outpacing politicians, religious leaders, and even the judiciary.
However, advocating for army supremacy in security matters raises practical questions. The LAF, with approximately 80,000 personnel, remains underfunded and under-equipped compared to Hezbollah’s estimated 100,000 fighters and sophisticated arsenal. Moreover, the army has historically avoided confrontation with Hezbollah, recognizing that such a conflict could split the institution along sectarian lines and reignite civil war.
The Patriarch’s emphasis on true security through state institutions rather than militias reflects a broader yearning among many Lebanese for a return to conventional statehood. Yet this vision confronts the reality that Lebanon’s consociational system—designed to balance sectarian interests—has proven more adept at preserving militia influence than building strong state institutions. Can Lebanon achieve the security framework its religious leaders envision without first addressing the political system that perpetuates fragmentation?
