Libya’s Double Gambit: Can Elections and Military Spending Buy Stability?

Libya’s parliament is betting that democratic preparations and military paychecks can coexist in a nation where armed groups often determine political outcomes.

A Fragile Political Landscape

Libya’s recent parliamentary moves reveal the delicate balancing act required to navigate a country still fractured more than a decade after Muammar Gaddafi’s fall. The appointment of election commission members signals renewed momentum toward long-delayed elections, originally scheduled for December 2021. Yet this democratic gesture comes paired with military pay increases—a telling reminder that in Libya, political legitimacy and military loyalty remain inextricably linked.

The North African nation has been split between rival administrations since 2014, with the internationally recognized Government of National Unity in Tripoli competing against a parallel government in the east. This division has created a complex web of militias, foreign mercenaries, and regular forces, all demanding their share of Libya’s oil wealth. The parliament’s dual approach—advancing electoral infrastructure while sweetening military compensation—reflects an attempt to satisfy both international demands for democratic progress and domestic pressures from armed constituencies.

The Electoral Commission: Progress or Performance?

The appointment of election commission members represents a tangible step forward after years of political deadlock. International stakeholders, particularly the United Nations, have consistently pushed for elections as the pathway to reunifying Libya’s institutions. However, previous attempts have faltered due to disputes over constitutional frameworks, candidate eligibility, and the sequencing of presidential versus parliamentary votes. The commission faces the monumental task of organizing credible elections in a country where territorial control remains contested and voter registration systems are fragmented.

Public reaction to these appointments has been mixed, with civil society groups cautiously optimistic while expressing concerns about the commission’s independence and capacity. Many Libyans remain skeptical after witnessing multiple failed electoral timelines, wondering whether this latest effort will fare any better than its predecessors. The commission’s success will largely depend on whether Libya’s various power brokers—including military commanders who now enjoy enhanced salaries—genuinely support or merely tolerate the democratic process.

Military Pay Hikes: Buying Peace or Postponing Problems?

The decision to increase military salaries reveals the parliament’s pragmatic recognition of where real power lies in Libya. With an estimated 140,000 men under arms across various formations, military personnel represent both a security necessity and a potential threat to stability. These pay increases may temporarily satisfy armed groups, reducing the likelihood of destabilizing protests or defections in the run-up to potential elections.

Yet this strategy carries significant risks. By reinforcing the military’s privileged economic position, parliament may be entrenching the very militarization of politics that elections are meant to overcome. Libya’s bloated public sector, which includes numerous fighters integrated into state payrolls after 2011, already consumes much of the national budget. These salary increases could deepen the country’s dependence on oil revenues while creating expectations that future governments will struggle to meet.

The Broader Implications

This dual approach illuminates a fundamental tension in post-conflict transitions: the need to accommodate existing power structures while building new democratic institutions. Libya’s parliament appears to be pursuing a strategy of managed coexistence, hoping that electoral legitimacy and military contentment can reinforce rather than undermine each other. This reflects a growing recognition that purely technocratic approaches to democratization often fail when they ignore the realities of armed politics.

For Libya’s international partners, these developments present both opportunity and concern. The establishment of an election commission provides a concrete mechanism for supporting democratic transition, while military pay increases might ensure sufficient stability for elections to occur. However, the long-term sustainability of buying military loyalty remains questionable, particularly if oil prices fluctuate or political competition intensifies post-election.

As Libya inches toward another attempt at elections, the fundamental question remains: Can a country simultaneously prepare for democracy while reinforcing the economic foundations of military power, or will these parallel tracks ultimately collide?