Disarmament or Discord: Palestinian Factions Face Internal Sabotage in Lebanon’s Refugee Camps

As Palestinian leadership attempts to stabilize Lebanon’s volatile refugee camps through disarmament, warnings of internal opposition reveal the complex web of interests that perpetuate the cycle of violence.

A History of Armed Isolation

Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps have existed in a state of armed autonomy since the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which granted Palestinian factions the right to bear arms within camp boundaries. This arrangement, born from the Lebanese Civil War era, has created pockets of territory where Lebanese security forces have limited jurisdiction. Over decades, what began as organized resistance movements has fragmented into a patchwork of competing factions, criminal gangs, and unaffiliated armed groups, transforming the camps into powder kegs that periodically explode into violence.

The camps, home to over 450,000 Palestinian refugees according to UNRWA estimates, have become synonymous with lawlessness in Lebanese public discourse. Recent clashes in Ein el-Hilweh, Lebanon’s largest camp, left dozens dead and highlighted the urgent need for security reform. Yet previous disarmament attempts have consistently failed, undermined by the very factions meant to implement them.

The Fifth Column Phenomenon

The term “fifth column” – historically used to describe internal saboteurs working against their own side – carries particular weight in the Palestinian political lexicon. Palestinian leaders’ warnings suggest that certain elements within their own community actively benefit from the current chaos and are working to derail Fatah’s disarmament initiative. These spoilers likely include arms dealers, criminal networks that thrive in the security vacuum, and rival political factions who see Fatah’s consolidation of control as a threat to their influence.

This internal resistance reflects deeper fractures within Palestinian politics. While Fatah, the dominant Palestinian political party, seeks to demonstrate responsible governance and improve relations with Lebanese authorities, other factions view disarmament as capitulation. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and various smaller groups maintain that arms are essential for eventual return to Palestine, creating an ideological divide that transcends mere power politics.

Lebanon’s Security Dilemma

For Lebanon, already grappling with economic collapse and political paralysis, the armed camps represent an existential threat. The presence of uncontrolled weapons has made the camps recruiting grounds for extremist groups and bases for criminal operations that spill into Lebanese territory. Yet the Lebanese government faces a catch-22: direct intervention risks massive bloodshed and regional condemnation, while continued non-intervention allows the security threat to metastasize.

The international community, particularly UNRWA and Western donors who fund camp services, find themselves similarly constrained. Supporting disarmament could improve camp conditions and Lebanese stability, but risks being seen as abandoning the Palestinian cause. This delicate balance has produced years of half-measures and failed initiatives.

The Path Forward

Fatah’s current disarmament push represents perhaps the most serious attempt in years to address the camps’ security crisis. By framing it as an internal Palestinian initiative rather than Lebanese-imposed disarmament, Fatah hopes to maintain legitimacy while achieving practical security gains. However, the warnings about fifth column sabotage suggest that even this approach faces serious obstacles.

Success will require not just removing weapons, but addressing the underlying conditions that make arms attractive: economic desperation, political marginalization, and the absence of hope for either integration in Lebanon or return to Palestine. Without comprehensive reform that includes economic opportunity and political representation, disarmament risks creating a power vacuum that criminal elements will rush to fill.

As Palestinian leaders confront both external pressures and internal resistance, one must ask: Can any disarmament initiative succeed when those it aims to protect have learned to profit from the very chaos it seeks to end?