Lebanon’s Impossible Choice: Disarm Hezbollah and Risk Civil War, or Live with a State Within a State

The prospect of forcibly disarming Hezbollah presents Lebanon with a devastating paradox: restore state sovereignty at the cost of national unity, or preserve fragile peace while accepting permanent institutional paralysis.

A Nation Held Hostage by History

Lebanon’s relationship with Hezbollah has evolved from one of resistance movement to political party to de facto parallel state, creating an unprecedented challenge for governance in the small Mediterranean nation. Since its emergence in the 1980s during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has transformed from a militia into Lebanon’s most powerful military force, surpassing even the Lebanese Armed Forces in both weaponry and combat experience. This evolution has left the country in a perpetual state of institutional schizophrenia, where official state apparatus must coexist with—and often defer to—an armed non-state actor that answers to Tehran as much as to Beirut.

The Sectarian Powder Keg

The warnings from Arab media about potential civil war are not hyperbolic given Lebanon’s traumatic history. The country’s delicate sectarian balance, formalized in the National Pact and reinforced after the 1975-1990 civil war, relies on careful power-sharing among Sunnis, Shias, Christians, and other groups. Any attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah would be perceived not merely as a security operation but as an existential threat to the Shia community’s political leverage and protection. The concern about Lebanese Army defections among Shia officers reflects a deeper reality: Lebanon’s institutions themselves are sectarian constructs, making any action against Hezbollah tantamount to one part of the state attacking another.

Recent regional developments have intensified this dilemma. As Iran’s influence faces challenges across the Middle East and international pressure on Hezbollah mounts following various regional conflicts, some Lebanese factions see an opportunity to reclaim state sovereignty. Yet the timing could hardly be worse, with Lebanon mired in economic collapse, its currency worthless, and basic services failing. The state that would need to fill the vacuum left by a disarmed Hezbollah barely functions, while Hezbollah’s social services network often provides what the government cannot.

The International Dimension

The disarmament question extends far beyond Lebanon’s borders, touching on regional power dynamics, international terrorism designations, and great power competition. Western nations, particularly the United States and France, have long pressed for Hezbollah’s disarmament as part of UN Security Council Resolution 1559. Yet these same powers recognize that pushing too hard could destabilize one of the few relatively functional states remaining in a region plagued by chaos. Meanwhile, Iran views Hezbollah as its primary deterrent against Israeli action and a key component of its “axis of resistance,” making any disarmament scenario a red line for Tehran.

The Lebanese Armed Forces, often portrayed as the solution to the Hezbollah question, face an impossible position. With a budget a fraction of Hezbollah’s resources and a consciously weak structure designed to prevent military coups, the LAF could neither forcibly disarm Hezbollah nor fill the security vacuum its absence would create. International efforts to strengthen the LAF run into the paradox that a truly powerful Lebanese military might threaten the very sectarian balance it’s meant to protect.

No Good Options

Lebanon’s political elite understand these realities, which explains why calls for disarmament often remain rhetorical rather than practical. The 2008 events, when Hezbollah briefly turned its weapons inward during political disputes, demonstrated the group’s capacity to paralyze the country within hours. Since then, an unspoken understanding has emerged: Hezbollah maintains its weapons ostensibly pointed outward, while other factions refrain from serious disarmament efforts.

As Lebanon approaches potential collapse, the question becomes not whether Hezbollah should be disarmed, but whether the Lebanese state possesses sufficient coherence to survive either attempting disarmament or continuing to accommodate an armed parallel authority. Can a nation indefinitely exist with two armies, two foreign policies, and two social contracts—or will the weight of this contradiction ultimately force a reckoning that no faction truly wants?