The New Scramble for Africa: How Naval Bases in Sudan Signal a Return to Great Power Competition
As Russia negotiates for a Red Sea naval base in Sudan, the ghost of 19th-century imperial rivalry returns to haunt one of the world’s most strategic waterways.
The Strategic Chess Board Takes Shape
The Red Sea has emerged as the latest theater for great power competition, with Russia’s proposed naval base in Sudan representing a significant escalation in Moscow’s bid to project power beyond its traditional spheres of influence. This development, negotiated directly with Sudan’s military authorities rather than civilian officials, marks a troubling confluence of authoritarian cooperation and strategic positioning that could reshape maritime security from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.
The timing is particularly significant. With China already operating its first overseas military base in Djibouti since 2017, Russia’s entry would complete a triangle of non-Western powers controlling key positions along one of the world’s most vital shipping lanes. Approximately 12% of global trade passes through the Red Sea, including crucial energy supplies heading to Europe and goods flowing between Asia and the West.
Beyond Traditional Spheres of Influence
What makes this development particularly alarming for Western policymakers is not merely the presence of rival powers, but the method of their arrival. By dealing directly with Sudan’s military leadership—which seized power in a 2021 coup—Russia is effectively legitimizing and strengthening authoritarian rule while bypassing any pretense of civilian governance or democratic accountability. This pattern of autocratic solidarity represents a new model of international relations where military strongmen trade strategic assets for regime support.
The implications extend far beyond Sudan’s borders. A Russian base in Port Sudan would provide Moscow with a permanent warm-water port on the Red Sea, allowing it to threaten Western interests across multiple regions simultaneously. Russian naval vessels could monitor or potentially disrupt shipping through the Suez Canal, project power into the Arabian Peninsula, and maintain a permanent presence in waters that have traditionally been dominated by the U.S. Fifth Fleet.
The Democracy Deficit in Strategic Competition
Perhaps most concerning is what this reveals about the changing nature of international competition. During the Cold War, both superpowers at least paid lip service to ideological legitimacy and sought to work through local political movements. Today’s competition appears more transactional and cynical, with authoritarian powers openly collaborating to create facts on the ground that democratic nations struggle to counter.
The U.S. and its allies face a fundamental dilemma: how to compete for influence when rivals are willing to embrace and empower military dictatorships without conditions. Traditional tools of diplomacy, development aid tied to governance improvements, and support for civil society appear increasingly inadequate when competing against powers offering immediate military support and no questions asked.
As the Red Sea becomes increasingly crowded with the naval forces of competing powers, we must ask ourselves: are we witnessing the emergence of a new world order where strategic waterways become divided into spheres of influence, controlled not by international law but by whoever is willing to make deals with local strongmen?
