The Enemy of My Enemy: Why Supporting Syrian Jihadists Against Iran Could Backfire Spectacularly
The West’s decades-old strategy of backing extremist groups to counter regional adversaries may be reaching a dangerous inflection point in Syria.
A Familiar but Fraught Strategy
The idea of supporting jihadist groups as a counterweight to Iran represents a continuation of Cold War-era proxy strategies that have repeatedly haunted Western policymakers. From the mujahideen in Afghanistan to various rebel groups across the Middle East, the tactical alliance with extremist elements has often produced strategic nightmares. Dr. Walid Phares, a prominent voice in international relations circles, is now sounding the alarm about proposals to leverage Syrian jihadist groups against Tehran’s regional ambitions.
The Syrian conflict, now in its second decade, has created a complex web of militant organizations with shifting allegiances and opportunistic agendas. While some Western strategists view these groups as potential tools to pressure Iran and its proxies, the historical record suggests such calculations rarely account for the long-term consequences of empowering radical movements.
The Convergence Risk
Phares’s warning about a potential “mother of all deals” between Sunni jihadist groups and Shia Khomeinists points to a nightmare scenario that challenges conventional wisdom about sectarian divisions in the Middle East. While theological and political rivalries between these camps run deep, history shows that tactical alliances against common enemies are not unprecedented. Hamas, a Sunni organization, has long maintained ties with Shia Iran despite doctrinal differences.
The prospect of such an alliance targeting Israel and regional minorities – including Christians, Yazidis, Kurds, and others – would represent a catastrophic realignment of Middle Eastern politics. These communities, already devastated by years of conflict and persecution, could face an existential threat if extremist factions across the sectarian divide find common cause in their elimination.
Beyond Sectarian Lines
The potential for jihadist groups to pivot from their current enemies to new targets underscores the fundamental unpredictability of proxy warfare. Today’s assets can become tomorrow’s liabilities, as the United States learned painfully in Afghanistan. The Syrian theater, with its overlapping conflicts and fluid alliances, presents even greater risks for miscalculation.
Policy Implications for a Multipolar Middle East
As the United States recalibrates its Middle East strategy amid great power competition with China and Russia, the temptation to outsource regional balancing to local actors grows stronger. However, empowering jihadist groups – even temporarily – could accelerate regional instability rather than contain it. The collapse of state authority in Syria has already created ungoverned spaces where extremist ideologies flourish and humanitarian catastrophes unfold.
Furthermore, any Western support for jihadist elements would likely push regional states to hedge their bets, potentially driving traditional allies toward Russia or China. The reputational costs of backing extremist groups, particularly given the global focus on counterterrorism, could undermine broader Western objectives in the region.
If Phares’s scenario materialized – with Sunni and Shia extremists coordinating attacks on Israel and minority populations – the resulting crisis would likely draw direct military intervention from multiple powers, risking a wider regional conflagration that could make current conflicts pale in comparison. In an era where policymakers seek to reduce military commitments abroad, such a development would paradoxically demand even greater engagement.
