Syria’s Diplomatic Tightrope: Engaging Israel While Denying Its Existence
Syria’s latest diplomatic stance reveals the enduring contradictions of Middle Eastern geopolitics: negotiating with an entity whose legitimacy you refuse to acknowledge.
The Ghost of 1974
Ahmad Mowafaq Zaidan’s recent Al Jazeera interview illuminates Syria’s attempt to thread an impossibly narrow needle. As media advisor to the Syrian president, Zaidan insists that any talks with Israel are strictly limited to returning to the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement—the ceasefire arrangement that ended the Yom Kippur War and established a UN-monitored buffer zone in the Golan Heights. This position allows Damascus to engage in practical security discussions while maintaining its longstanding rejection of Israel’s right to exist, a stance that has defined Syrian foreign policy since 1948.
The 1974 agreement represents both a pragmatic necessity and an ideological compromise. It acknowledged the reality of Israeli military control over the Golan Heights while preserving Syria’s claim to the territory. Nearly five decades later, Syria finds itself invoking this Cold War-era arrangement as its maximum diplomatic position, even as the regional landscape has transformed beyond recognition.
Abraham Accords: The Elephant in the Room
Zaidan’s dismissal of potential Syrian participation in the Abraham Accords reveals the deep fissures within the Arab world’s approach to Israel. His assertion that these agreements are “between countries that have no borders with Israel” serves as both a geographic observation and a pointed critique. The UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—all Abraham Accords signatories—indeed lack direct borders with Israel, allowing them to frame normalization as a distant diplomatic exercise rather than an immediate security concern.
For Syria, however, the Golan Heights represents not just a border but an open wound. Israel’s 1981 annexation of the territory, though unrecognized internationally, created facts on the ground that no amount of UN resolutions have reversed. Syria’s insistence on the territory’s “occupied” status reflects both international law and domestic political necessity—no Syrian leader could survive politically while appearing to abandon claims to the Golan.
The Broader Strategic Calculus
Syria’s position emerges at a fascinating historical moment. The country remains fractured after more than a decade of civil war, with Turkish, American, and Russian forces operating within its borders. Iran, Syria’s closest ally, maintains significant influence through military advisors and proxy forces. In this context, even limited engagement with Israel represents a delicate balancing act that could upset multiple regional powers.
The emphasis on the 1974 agreement also signals Syria’s desire for stability without ideological capitulation. By framing any discussions as merely returning to an existing framework rather than creating new realities, Damascus can pursue de-escalation while maintaining its revolutionary credentials. This approach allows Syria to potentially benefit from reduced tensions without facing the domestic and regional backlash that formal recognition would entail.
As the Middle East continues its tectonic shifts—with Saudi-Israeli normalization talks and Iranian nuclear negotiations dominating headlines—Syria’s stance represents both continuity and adaptation. The question remains: in a region where yesterday’s impossibilities become tomorrow’s realities, how long can Damascus maintain its diplomatic fiction of negotiating with a neighbor that supposedly doesn’t exist?
