How a Failed Intervention 54 Years Ago Still Shapes Middle Eastern Alliances Today

The Syrian military’s catastrophic foray into Jordan in 1970 reveals why regional powers still struggle to project force beyond their borders—and why proxy conflicts remain the preferred battleground.

The Forgotten War Within a War

On September 18, 1970, Syrian armored columns rumbled across the Jordanian border at Ramtha, ostensibly to support Palestinian fedayeen locked in brutal combat with King Hussein’s Arab Legion. This intervention, now largely forgotten outside specialist circles, marked a critical juncture in Middle Eastern geopolitics that would reshape regional dynamics for generations. The conflict, known as Black September, pitted Jordan’s Hashemite monarchy against Palestinian militant groups who had established a virtual state-within-a-state on Jordanian soil.

The Syrian intervention represented far more than military assistance to Palestinian factions. It was an audacious attempt by Damascus to expand its influence westward, potentially toppling a Western-aligned monarchy and establishing Syria as the dominant power in the Levant. President Hafez al-Assad, then defense minister, deployed approximately 300 tanks in what appeared to be an overwhelming force against Jordan’s smaller military.

When Regional Ambitions Collide with Reality

The operation quickly unraveled in ways that would prove instructive for future Middle Eastern conflicts. Jordan’s small but highly professional air force, aided by Israeli threats to intervene and American naval movements in the Eastern Mediterranean, decimated Syrian armor in the open desert terrain. Within days, Syrian forces retreated in disarray, having lost dozens of tanks and failed to link up with Palestinian forces. King Hussein’s forces proceeded to crush the Palestinian resistance, driving the Palestine Liberation Organization’s leadership to Lebanon and forever altering Jordan’s demographic and political landscape.

The immediate aftermath saw a curious realignment: Assad used the military failure to oust his rivals and consolidate power in Damascus, while Jordan emerged as an unlikely island of stability. The Palestinian movement, expelled from Jordan, would spend the next decade destabilizing Lebanon instead. Most significantly, the crisis demonstrated the limitations of conventional military intervention in the Arab world—a lesson that would echo through subsequent decades in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria itself.

The Modern Echoes of Ancient Failures

Today’s Middle Eastern powers have clearly internalized the lessons of 1970. Direct military intervention by regional states remains remarkably rare, replaced instead by proxy warfare, militias, and hybrid operations. Iran supports Hezbollah rather than deploying Revolutionary Guards en masse; Saudi Arabia funds Syrian rebels rather than sending armored brigades; Turkey uses Syrian mercenaries in Libya rather than regular forces. The Syrian intervention in Jordan demonstrated that even authoritarian regimes must contend with international pressure, the risk of military humiliation, and the danger of domestic blowback from failed adventures.

The Black September intervention also crystallized the peculiar dynamics of Middle Eastern conflict: how quickly allies become enemies, how domestic legitimacy can evaporate with military failure, and how great power involvement remains the ultimate arbiter of regional disputes. These patterns persist today in Yemen’s civil war, Syria’s fragmentation, and the ongoing shadow war between Israel and Iran.

Conclusion

As we witness contemporary Middle Eastern powers struggling to project influence—from Saudi Arabia’s quagmire in Yemen to Turkey’s precarious position in Syria—the ghost of that failed September intervention looms large. The question remains: have regional powers truly learned that military adventurism carries unacceptable risks, or are they simply waiting for a moment when international attention wavers and the conditions seem more favorable for the next cross-border gamble?