When Superpowers Unite: How Cold War Rivals Prevented a Regional War in 1970

The Syrian withdrawal from Jordan in September 1970 stands as a rare moment when American and Soviet interests aligned to prevent a Middle Eastern conflict from spiraling into global catastrophe.

The Forgotten Crisis of Black September

In September 1970, Jordan teetered on the brink of collapse. Palestinian fedayeen groups, having established a virtual state-within-a-state, openly challenged King Hussein’s authority. The crisis reached its zenith when Syria, then governed by a radical Ba’athist regime, sent armored columns across the border to support Palestinian forces against the Jordanian military. What followed was a brutal conflict that would later be known as “Black September,” claiming thousands of lives and reshaping the political landscape of the Middle East.

The Syrian intervention transformed a domestic Jordanian crisis into a potential regional conflagration. With Syrian tanks rolling toward Amman and King Hussein’s forces struggling to hold the line, the specter of Jordan’s collapse loomed large. Such an outcome would have created a power vacuum in a strategically vital nation, potentially drawing in Israel, Egypt, and Iraq into a broader conflict.

An Unlikely Coalition of Pressure

The international response to Syria’s intervention revealed the complex dynamics of Cold War diplomacy in the Middle East. The United States, committed to preventing Soviet-aligned Syria from toppling a Western-friendly monarchy, mobilized the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and placed airborne units on alert. Simultaneously, Israel, viewing a Syrian-controlled Jordan as an existential threat, mobilized its forces along the northern border and prepared for potential air strikes.

More surprisingly, the Soviet Union, despite its ties to Syria, joined in pressuring Damascus to withdraw. Moscow’s calculations were pragmatic: a regional war risked direct superpower confrontation and could undermine Soviet influence among Arab states. The Kremlin’s diplomatic pressure on Syria, combined with American threats and Israeli military preparations, created an overwhelming incentive for withdrawal.

The Syrian retreat on September 23-24, 1970, came after significant military losses inflicted by Jordan’s small but effective air force, aided by the threat of Israeli intervention. Syrian forces, lacking air cover and facing mounting casualties, withdrew in disarray, leaving Palestinian forces to face King Hussein’s army alone.

Lessons for Contemporary Crisis Management

The resolution of the 1970 Jordan crisis offers enduring insights into international conflict management. First, it demonstrates that even bitter adversaries can find common ground when regional stability is at stake. The tacit cooperation between Washington and Moscow, despite their global rivalry, prevented a localized conflict from metastasizing into a broader war.

Second, the crisis highlighted the effectiveness of coordinated diplomatic and military pressure. The combination of American naval movements, Israeli military mobilization, and Soviet diplomatic intervention created multiple pressure points that left Syria isolated and without options. This multi-layered approach proved more effective than any single nation’s efforts could have been.

Finally, the episode underscores the importance of regional balance of power considerations. Each external actor—the US, USSR, and Israel—acted not out of altruism but from calculated self-interest in preventing regional destabilization. This convergence of interests, however temporary, created the conditions for successful crisis resolution.

The Aftermath and Its Echoes

The Syrian withdrawal marked a turning point with far-reaching consequences. Jordan’s monarchy survived, but at the cost of expelling Palestinian armed groups, who relocated to Lebanon and contributed to that country’s subsequent civil war. Syria’s military humiliation contributed to Hafez al-Assad’s rise to power two months later, ushering in a more pragmatic but equally authoritarian regime. The crisis also demonstrated Israel’s role as a regional military power capable of influencing events beyond its borders.

Today, as the Middle East faces new forms of proxy warfare and regional competition, the lessons of September 1970 remain relevant. The successful prevention of a wider war required not just military deterrence but also diplomatic flexibility and a recognition of mutual interests among adversaries. In an era of renewed great power competition, can Washington, Moscow, and regional powers find similar moments of convergence to prevent today’s conflicts from spiraling out of control?